Washington Law Review
Volume 10

Number 1

1-1-1935

The Coordination and Integration of Federal, State, and Local Tax
Systems
James K. Hall

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James K. Hall, The Coordination and Integration of Federal, State, and Local Tax Systems, 10 Wash. L.
Rev. 22 (1935).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

THE COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL TAX SYSTEMS'
JAMES K. HALL*

Of the fiscal problems pressing for immediate solution, few are
as important economically and socially as the problem of establishing proper working relationships between and among the fiscal
systems of the federal, state, and local governments. Today, as in
the past, there is a conspicuous lack of coordination and integration
among these several revenue systems. Only in recent years has any
considerable emphasis been placed on the importance and necessity
of visualizing our fiscal problems in perspective-of viewing the
problems and issues of local, of state, or of federal finance as integral parts of a related whole. Pragmatic exigencies often have
required, apparently, separate and isolated treatment of fiscal
problems of some one, or several, political jurisdictions of the same
class, as distinct from the other jurisdictions with which there is
interrelation of problems. The results demonstrate the basic super
ficiality and futility of this approach. Until recently, discussions
of the financial relationships of our several governments have been
largely confined to academic halls and treatises and to some few
professional and technical associations.' In the last two decades
the subject of the relationship of the tax systems of the local governments, the commonwealths, and the nation has attracted an
increasing amount of interest from the public, our political leader
ship, and our academicians. The existing situation is receiving an
increasing measure of censure and condemnation. In some cases,
considered proposals looking toward reform have been made.
The problem of fiscal coordination and integration is but a part
of the larger problem of intergovernmental relationships in their
Professor of Economics and Business, University of Washington
Presented in part in the form of an address before the Thirteenth
Annual Pacific Coast Economic Conference at Occidental College, December 27, 1934.
See, for example, Seligman, E. R. A., Essays in Taxation, Chs. XII
and XXI, Tenth Edition Revised, 1931, ibid., "Relation of State and
Federal Finance," Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1909, pp. 213-26,
ibld., "The Fiscal Outlook and 'the Coordination of Public Revenues,"
Current Problems in Public Finance, New York University Symposium.
1933, pp. 261-275, Willis, H. P., "Relation of Federal to State and Local
Taxation," Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1907, pp. 201-10- Discussions on the Relations of Federal and State Taxation, Proceedings,
National Tax Association, 1909, pp. 239-64, General Discussion, Relation
of Federal and State Taxation, Proceedings, National Tax Association,
1919, pp. 128-46, Leland, S. E., "The Relations of Federal, State and
Local Finance," Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1930, pp. 94-106,
Haig, R. M., "The Coordination of the Federal and State Tax Systems,"
Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1932, pp. 220-233; Edmonds, F S.,
"A Taxing Program for the Nation," Proceedings. National Tax Asso*
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many phases. So closely interlocked with the problem of fiscal
integration are the problems of revision and improvement in our
governmental structure and the coordination of governmental
functions that, for purposes of perspective, they should not be disassociated. The establishment of healthy fiscal environments for
our political jurisdictions must be accompanied by the elimination
of overlapping and duplicating administrative units and the coordination and proper placement of governmental functions.
We should recognize that governmental revenues are simply the
counterpart of governmental expenditures, which, in turn, depend
upon the character and extent of governmental functions and of
the administrative structure which has been erected for their performance.
By tradition and custom the geographical area over winch a
government has jurisdiction has determined its relative prestige
and importance. As stated by Professor Leland, "acres of occupancy rather than
the importance of functions performed
or the volume of operations" has been the criterion of governmental ranking." Under loosely knit federalism, our jurisdictional
structure has developed with the public following dictates of individualism, experimenting not wisely but well, believing in the
efficacy of home rule, and opposing centralization and standardization. There has evolved, in consequence, a multiplicity of governments and administrative agencies with such variation, duplication, and overlapping of structure and of function as best to be
described as a chaos of areas, a chaos of authorities, and a chaos
of revenues. Logically, a complex economic and social order should
require a complex governmental organization. However, to plumb
the depths of absurdity with the gross and unnecessary development of layer upon layer of adnmmistrative units, with functional
duplication of the most illogical and wasteful character, and with
an extreme lack of structural and functional coordination is not
to accommodate government to the facts of a complex economic
and social organism. Rather, conflicts, frictions, and economic
wastes are progotedi-to the public disadvantage. Existing governmental complexity provides no enviable claim to distinction.
In Cook County, outside the limits of Chicago, are found "9
cities, 76 villages, 30 townships, 192 school districts, over 30 park

ciation, 1933, pp. 30-39; Groves, H. M., "Uniformity in State and Local

Taxation," Current Problems in Public Finance, New York University
Symposium, 1933, pp. 276-286, Leland, S. E., "Coordination of Federal,
State and Local Fiscal Systems," Address, Municipal Finance Officers'
(reprinted).
Association
3

Leland, S. E., "Coordination of Federal, State and Local Fiscal Systems," op. cit., p. .
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districts, over 40 road and bridge districts, 2 sanitary districts,
and enough additional subdivisions of government to aggregate
415 separate, independent units, each having power to levy taxes
and borrow money "4 In Chicago are found corresponding confusion and duplication in structure and functions with, for example, "twenty different authorities dealing with parks and recreation'' 5 and "five separate civil service commissions engaged in
the task of hiring public employees." 6 The State of Washington
with 2,505 political jurisdictions having power to levy property
taxes and to incur debt, among which are found 1,714 school districts, is, perhaps, rather typically illustrative of this situation in
the West.'
Our political jurisdictions in point of geographical area and
population have a wide range. The largest county in area in the
United States is San Bernardino County, California, with 20,175
square miles. 8 The combined area of the States of New Jersey,
Delaware, and Maryland is smaller than this one county 8 The
county government recognized as the smallest is that of Arlington
County, Virginia, which has an area of 25 square miles.10 In
population, Cook County, Illinois, is the largest with 3,982,123
inhabitants, and Alpine County, California, the smallest with 241
inhabitants."' Curiously enough, the range in area from the largest to the smallest county is about the same ratio as the range in
population, approximately 20,000 to 1.12 It is also interesting to
note that there is a significant inverse relationship between population and area. 3 The Bureau of the Census, as of July 1, 1934,
reported a total of 167,699 units of government with power to levy
direct property taxes.14 The thousands of governmental units
which do not levy property taxes are not included in this aggregate. The three classes of jurisdictions with the largest number ofunits are school districts, 125,627, townships, 19,980, and cities,
Leland, S. E., "The Relations of Federal, State and Local Finance, op.
cit., P. 101.
Ibid., p. 100.
IbNd., p. 101.

'United States Bureau of the Census, Number and Interrelationship
of Governmental Units That Levy Property Taxes, as of July 1, 1934, p. 6
(mimeographed report).
'Anderson, Win., The Units of Government in the United States, 1934,
p. 15.
1 Anderson, Win., op. cit., p. 15.
Ibzd., p. 17.
"Ibid.
"Ib.
b.

"Number and Interrelationship of Governmental Units That Levy
Property Taxes, as of July 1, 1934, p. 2 (mimeographed report).
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towns, and villages, 16,389.25 A rationalized plan of local governmental structure, as outlined by Professor Anderson, would reduce
the number of jurisdictions to approximately one-tenth the present
number.' 6 As Professor Lutz suggests, it is indeed fortunate that
the home rule issue has not arisen in support of the "ward or the
block as the smallest unit within which the people were presumed
to possess and enjoy the privileges of home rule.'1 7 With horizontal and vertical duplication and overlapping m governmental
structure and functions, the questions of fiscal support, inequitable taxation, and efficient performance of governmental responsibilities become exceedingly troublesome. With the continued expansion of the intensive and extensive functions and services of
government, these questions will become even more serious. Recognition of the unequal distribution of wealth and income among
individuals, economic groups, geographical areas, and existing political jurisdictions must be had, also, recognition of the mobility
of persons, wealth, and income, and an understanding that industry and commerce have no regard for state and local governmental
boundaries. Our governmental structure and authority must be
rationalized with the conditions and facts of modern economic life
if material progress is to be made in reorganization and integration
of our fiscal systems. It is hoped that the triteness of these remarks
will not detract from their underlying importance.
If we view briefly the existing fiscal relationships of our federal, state, and local tax systems, there is disclosed a situation of
partial separation of sources of revenue,--meaning thereby merely
types or forms of taxes and not the ultimate sources of purchasing
power,-of dual administration and use of the same types of
taxes, and a system of subventions and aids from the federal to
the state governments and from the state to the local governments. The fiscal interrelationships, such as there are, are haphazard, rl-conceived, temporary compromises to serve the need
of the moment.
The Federal Government, although a government of delegated
powers from the Constitution, has broad authority to tax in its
support. The American public and the framers of the Constitution gained a valuable lesson in public finance under the Articles
of Confederation when the Federal Government was hard put
to survive fiscally, and hence politically There was a realization
13Ibid.

pp. 35-36.
" Anderson, Win., op. cit.,
I"Reallocation of Functional Responsibilities and Reorganization of
Governmen'tal Structure as Measures for Securing Greater Economy in
Local Government," Current Problems in Public Finance, New York University Symposium, 1933, p. 85.i
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that no government of a sovereign character can maintain its dignity and discharge its political responsibilities when its fiscal existence is predicated on the questionable generosity and irregular
subsidies of other sovereign governments. The liberal provisions
of the Constitution relating to the taxing powers of the Congress
are testimentary of a well-earned lesson.
The power of the Federal Government to levy taxes drawn from
the Constitution likewise is limited by that document. The Congress can levy taxes provided that the object or person subject to
the tax is not outside its jurisdiction (sovereignty rule), provided,
apparently, that the power of taxation is exercised for a public
purpose as distinguished from a private purpose (welfare rule),' s
provided that direct taxes, e.g., property taxes, with the exception
of income taxes,1 9 are apportioned among the several states on the
basis of population (apportionment rule),20 provided that indirect
taxes are levied in accordance with geographical uniformity (uniformity rule),21 provided that no duties or taxes are levied on
exports from the states,2 2 provided that the taxing power is not
used in a capricious or palpably unreasonable way so as to be a
violation of due process, 23 provided that the taxing power is not
used for regulatory or other ulterior purposes in interference with
the powers reserved to the states, 4 and provided that the taxing
power is not applied to the instrumentalities or means employed
by the states in discharging their general, as distinguished from
their proprietary, governmental functions. 25 Subject to these
limitations which define the scope of the federal taxing power, the
Congress may act to fortify financially the Federal Treasury The
states have been generous, perhaps even more generous than was
realized at the time. However, with the growing belief that government is one, that functions are more important than political
jurisdictions, that serious fiscal frictions must be eliminated, and
that the cost of government as a whole must be minimized to an
extent consistent with the efficient performance of necessary services, it is not unreasonable to venture the prediction that the states
would agree to the elimnation of the apportionment rule 6 and to
"*United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. See Flint
r. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 154.
9INd., Amendment XVI.

I Ibid., Article I, Section 9, Clause 4.
" Ibid,., Article I, Section 8, Clause 1.
22Ibid.,

Article I, Section 9, Clause 5.

1 Ibid., Amendment V
' Ibid., Amendment X.
This limitation arises by reason of the existence of dual sovereignties
in our government. See Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 570.

"Haig,

R. M., op. cit., p. 221.
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a program of closely knit fiscal relationships with the Federal
Government.
The state taxing power lies in its mnherent right of sovereignty
The states, as in the case of the Federal Government, are subject
to the sovereignty rule and to the limitation of levying taxes for
public purposes only The states are further limited in their use
of the taxing power by provisions of the Federal Constitution
winch seek to maintain the theory of dual sovereignty They may
not enact tax or other statutes which conflict with the Federal
27
Constitution, laws, or terms of treaties with foreign nations.
There must not be interference with the borrowing power 28 of the
Federal Government or the obligations of contract29 in the exercise
of the taxing power. In addition, the states may not levy duties
on tonnage,30 discriminate against citizens of other states, 31 levy
32
duties on imports or exports without the consent of the Congress,
be so arbitrary and unreasonable in taxation as to violate due
process, 33 deny to a person the equal protection of their laws,84
interfere with interstate or foreign commerce, 35 or tax Federal
functions or instrumentalities."0 The respective state constitutions
also limit the character and extent of tax legislation. Requirements that taxes must be equal and/or uniform are commonly
found. Except for these limitations and such others as may be
embodied in their constitutions, the states are free to tax as they
see fit.
Local governments, the creations of the states, as counties, townships, municipalities, and special taxing districts, have no inherent
powers to tax, instead, they may tax only in accordance with the
delegated powers winch may be withdrawn or amended whenever the states so desire. In general, however, the states have
granted to local governments rather broad taxing powers. While
this may be consistent with the home rule principle, multiple
taxation and fiscal confusion have been the result of the tax activity of these numerous quasi-independent local political entities.
The customary or traditional fiscal relationship between the FedUnited States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2.
'Ibid., Article I, Section 8, Clause 2.
'9 Ibid., Article I, Section 10, Clause 1.
"Ibid., Article I, Section 10, Clause 3.
"1Tbid., Article IV Section 2, Clause 1.
IIbid., Arrticle I, Section 10, Clause 2.
3Ibd., Amendment XVI, Section 1.
"Ibid.
"Ibid., Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.
An implied limitation based on dual sovereignty. See Macauen Co.
v. Conwionwealth of Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620; Panhandle Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 277 U. S. 618.
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eral Government and the states until the Twentieth Century was
separation of sources of revenue except in times of financial
emergency when the Federal Government, temporarily, entered
the field of direct taxation. Otherwise, the latter government held
persistently to the use of indirect taxes in the form of customs
duties, and from time to time internal excises. The first direct
taxation by the Congress was in 1798 by the placement of a property tax on "dwelling-houses, lands and slaves."" A similar tax
was enacted in 1813 upon "lands, lots of ground with their im39
provements, dwelling houses and slaves, "8 and a like tax in 1815.
The Federal Government, faced with a fiscal emergency at the outbreak of the Civil War, again laid a tax on real estate.40 In these
and other instances the rule of apportionment was followed.' 1 The
Federal Government made but two attempts, on emergency occasions, to utilize income taxes prior to 1909. The first attempt was
in 1861 and continued until 1872, during which period it was
regarded as an indirect tax, the second was in 1894. The latter
Act did not become operative. The program of federal taxation,
therefore, has been one of reliance primarily on customs and excises
for revenue.
The state and local governments, on the other hand, relied principally upon the property tax with limited use of excises, license
taxes, fees, and other small miscellaneous sources of revenue. It
was not until the latter part of the Nineteenth Century that inheritance taxes became an established feature of many of our state
tax systems. While there had been some experimentation with
income taxes, it was not until the successful demonstration of Wisconsin in 1911 that income taxes came into widespread use as desirable state fiscal instrumentalities. The extent to which separation of sources of revenue had been followed by the state and federal governments is revealed by the almost complete absence of
duplicating types of taxes at the time the first National Conferference on State and Local Taxation was held in 1907 42 Since then
the rapid adoption of income, inheritance and estate, and internal
excise taxes by the commonwealth and national governments has
led to extreme duplication in types of taxes. Were duties on
imports not reserved by the Constitution to the exclusive use of
the Federal Government, the states doubtless would have tried to
"1

U. S. Statutes 597-8. (A levy of $2,000,000.)
3 U. S. Statutes 53, 26. (A levy of $3,000,000.)
IMd4., 164. (A levy of $6,000,000).
1012 U. S. Statutes 294. (A levy of $20,000,000.)
" Professor Haig states that the Federal Government resorted to direct
taxes on property on no less than five occasions during the period 1798
to 1861 inclusive. Haig, R. M., op. cit., p. 222.
42Haig, R. M., op. cit., p. 222.
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utilize that source of revenue m their frantic efforts to augment
income.
Personal income, as of January 1, 1934, is taxed by twenty-six
states and the Federal Government. 4S Under fiscal pressure, Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, and New Mexico
adopted and applied the personal income tax in 1933 for the first
time. The wide diversity and inequality in state income taxation
may be realized when residents are taxed on incomes from all
sources in twenty-one commonwealths, the exceptions being the
States of Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, and
South Carolina, while non-residents are taxed on income derived
from sources within the state by twenty jurisdictions, the exceptions in tins instance being Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont. Exemptions vary from none
in Ohio and Tennessee to $2,000 per single person in Massachusetts.
Twenty-two states express the exemption in dollars of net income,
while two states, Arizona and Wisconsin, provide an exemption in
dollars of computed tax. Twenty-one states have progressive rates
with a range of maximums from three to fifteen per cent. New
Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Vermont tax under
proportional rates, although the latter two vary the flat rates with
the character of the income. Offset legislation has appeared in
conformity to the demand of property owners that taxes on realty
be reduced. Fortunately, however, only two states apply such
ill-advised provisions, namely, Utah and New Mexico. 44 Six states,
to avoid, partially, a type of double taxation, permit non-residents
a credit allowance on income taxes paid to other states which grant
a reciprocal privilege. Virginia, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Georgia, Kansas, and Vermont provide similar credits to residents.
The Federal Government and twenty-six states, including Ohio,
as of January 1, 1934, lay taxes on, or measure taxes by, corporate
net income. The Ohio statute, according to the law and to judicial
interpretation, is construed as a property tax and not as an income
tax. As interest paid may not be deducted from interest received
under the Ohio statute, it is, economically, a corporate income tax
measured by modified gross income. Fiscal necessity in the last
few years has caused a number of states to adopt corporate net income taxes as, e.g., Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico, North Carolina,
and Oklahoma. Twenty states utilize proportionate rate§ with the
13These and following data relating to tax systems have been taken
from Tax Systems of the World, fifth edition, 1934, The Tax Research
Foundation.
"The property offset provision in the New Mexico personal income tax
was repealed by the special session of the legislature April 27, 1934. New
Mexico, Laws Extra Session, 1934, Chapt. 29, sec. 4, p. 117.
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maximums ranging from two per cent to eight per cent, while six
states provide for progressive rates with the maximums ranging
from four per cent for Idaho to six per cent for Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. One aspect of unequal taxation of corporate
net income, although, perhaps, not of serious practical import as
now applied, continues to find expression in the provision of progressive rates. Haphazard and wide variation in the exemption of
classes of corporations is the rule rather than the exception. Uniformity, likewise, is conspicuously absent in the determination of
non-taxable income and the allowed deductions. Provision is made
for the exemption of a portion of the corporations' net income bv
the States of Alabama, Arkansas, Iinnesota, Mississippi, New
Mexico, and Massachusetts. The allocation factors or formulae
used for purposes of apportioning net income for corporations
doing an interstate business are unstandardized and vary in the
case of almost every state. The simplest, and perhaps the most
inequitable formulae, are applied by Arkansas and Tennessee in
which apportionment of net income is on the basis of the gross
sales within the state to total gross sales. The majority of the states
taxing corporate net income have tried in recent years to develop
more refined formulae but without achieving any standardization
of practice. The problems of double taxation caused by the use of
inconsistent and conflicting methods of income allocation are very
serious and will become increasingly troublesome as the number
of states taxing corporate income increases, unless there is standardization of formulae.4 5 The highly peculiar and inequitable
results now obtaining leave little room for doubt.
The Committee on Uniformity and Reciprocity in State Taxing
Legislation of the National Tax Association secured information
relating to the taxation of four large interstate corporations as a
basis for its study and report in 1930. The situation found was
of a character to present a major challenge to our existing tax
policies and practices. A summary of these data as stated by the
Committee is as follows
" 'A' corporation is engaged in business in thirty-five
states. It pays a total of 198 taxes, or an average of six
per state, in thirty-three different forms, running from one
tax to thirteen taxes per state.
'B' corporation is engaged in business in twentyseven states and is obliged to prepare and file sixty differ
ent reports, each with peculiar characteristics, the number
being required by the various states running from one report to five per year.
'O Report of Committee on Uniformity and Reniprocity in State Taxing Legislation, Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1933, p. 262.
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" 'C' corporation is engaged in business in thirty-six
jurisdictions and finds itself subject to 108 taxes of eighteen varieties, the least popular being imposed by one
state, and the most popular by twenty-four states.
" 'D' corporation, which is a manufacturing corporation, has twelve plants in the United States and Canada,
and finds that its 1928 taxes varied from 0.47 to 2.84 at
each plant in the ratio of the amount of taxes to the book
value of taxable property and from 0.45 to 2.13 in the
ratio of total taxes to the output of each plant." 8
In the above illustrations the computations relate only to taxes
and charges of the states and property taxes imposed by the local
governments and not to the large variety of licenses, fees, and
charges which local governments commonly see fit to exact. 47 The
language of the Committee is apt in describing such gunshot tax
inflictions of our state and local governments as "comparable in
number and bitterness to the plagues sent upon Egypt." '
The lack of cooperation between and among the states and the
rivalry which is engendered by competitive bidding for capital,
business, population, and private wealth result in gross incongruities and vicious practices exemplified both in tax laws and tax
administration with especial reference to the property tax. It is
not confined to the states, as the localities likewise seem to find
it to their advantage to participate in the "good" work. With
much capital highly mobile, with the tax situs of persons of wealth
and large incomes subject to relatively easy change, with many
business corporations able and willing to shift or change their
operations in response to state and local tax policies, those states
attempting to practice reasonably uniform and equitable taxation
find themselves at a distinct disadvantage. Premiums are placed
on unfairly discriminatory tax laws and tax administration. Harold M. Groves, of the Wisconsin Tax Comunission, has called attention to the major difficulties of maintaining scientific assessment
-and equalization of property taxes in a state such as Wisconsin
when neighboring states are engaged in the effective prostitution
of their tax systems to serve competitive purposes.4 9 Comnnissioner Groves states that one large corporation in Wisconsin pays
taxes 350% higher than would be required in an alternative location -in iclgan.5 0 In 1927, one moderately important manu"1Proceedings, National Tax Association, 1930, pp. 347-8.

"Ibid., p. 348.
"IbMd.
"Groves, H. M., op. cit., pp. 280-281. See also Leffler, G. L., and Groves,

H. M., Wisconsin Industry and the Wisconsin Tax System, Wisconsin
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Bulletin No. 1, 1930; Bulletin No. 2, 1931.
Groves, H. M., op. cit., p. 283.
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facturing corporation in Wisconsin had its inventory assessed for
taxation in an amount almorst equal to the assessment of all the
manufacturers' inventories in Illinois, or $13,000,000 to $15,140,000
in the former as compared with the latter. 51 it is significant also
that the assessment of manufacturers' tools, machinery, and equipment in Illinois declined fifteen per cent from 1921 to 1927 2
In the State of Washington the aggregate unequalized assessed
valuation of property was $1,006,310,548 in 1933 as compared with
$962,602,783 in 1911.51 The evils of underassessment, of inequitable assessment, and of partial or complete tax exemption of property which should be on the tax rolls (through the use of legal
and extra-legal procedures) are so well known as not to require
5 4

elaboration.

Inheritance and/or estate taxes, as of January 1, 1934, are in
effect in every state of the Union. State inheritance taxation is
characterized by the same absence of uniformity, both in form and
in practice, as in the case of income taxation. However, the provision of the Federal Estate tax which establishes a credit of eighty
per cent of the amount of death duties paid to the state against the
federal tax-described by Professor Lutz as a "means of whipping
the Devil around the bush" 5 -- has been influential not only in
causing the states to adjust the weight of their death taxes to take
full advantage of this credit, but to enact this form of tax legislation. Thirty-five of the states provide for state absorption of the
full eighty per cent credit.
Multiple taxation of intangibles, and to a lesser extent of tangible personalty, has been an undesirable and inequitable feature
of state inheritance taxation in the past. Under the leadership of
the National Tax Association the states have been encouraged to
enact reciprocity legislation in regard to the non-taxation of intangible personalty of non-resident decedents. Legislation of this
character has been passed by thirty-nine states. Recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court appear to have clarified the
situation and to have made impossible the double taxation of the
same assets evea by the non-reciprocal states. 58 In Frick v. Pennsylvania,7 the rule was clearly established that the state of domicile
of the decedent owner of tangible personalty could not tax
Leffler, G. L., and Groves, H. M., op. cit., Bulletin No. 1, 1930, p. 62.
Ibd.

Data from the Washington State Tax Commission.
See Simpson, H. D., Tax Racket and Tax Reform in Chicago, 1930,
for a discussion of the situation in Chicago and Cook County, Illinois.
Lutz, H. L., Public Finance, 1930, p. 543.
Report of Committee on Uniformity and Reciprocity in State Tax
Legislation, op. cit., 1932, p. 183.
"'268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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tangible personalty having an "actual" situs elsewhere. In the
state inheritance taxation of intangibles, the Supreme Court, in
applying the maxim mobiia sequcntur personam, subject to the
exception that intangible personalty may acquire a business situs
apart from the owner, holds that this kind of personal property
cannot be within the taxing power of nore than one jurisdiction. '
While the majority of states have provisions relating to the
taxation of gifts made in anticipation of death, a number do not.
Rates of inheritance taxation vary widely, as do exemptions for
beneficiaries, classification of beneficiaries, and the degree of progression as determined by the rates and the character of the
blocking.
Although multiple taxation of the assets of a decedent's estate
by the states appears to be a thing of the past, there is no standardization of taxing practice among the states, as is evidenced by
the variation in rates, classifications, and exemptions. Furthermore, the federal and state governments combine in the use of the
same form of taxation, thereby causing delay, friction, and illfeeling.
Existing excise taxation by the federal, state, and local governr
ments presents a situation of confusion confounded. Few illustrations are needed to show the low level of tax competition to which
our political jurisdictions have descended in their intensified search
for revenue. Gasoline taxation, while originally a state revenue
device, is now used by municipalities and counties, by all the states,
and by the Federal Government. First adopted by the State of
Oregon in 1919 and taxed typically at a rate of one cent a gallon,
gasoline is now taxed by the states at rates ranging from two to
seven cents per gallon. In 1932 the gasoline tax produced revenue
in excess of a half billion dollars for the states. Tobacco is specially
taxed by the Federal Government and fifteen states with wide variation in rates and taxing procedure. State excise taxation of this
commodity, is a product of the last decade. Eight states have
registration taxes on mortgages and/or bonds, stocks, leases, and
the like, in conjunction with the Federal Government which also
imposes a tax on conveyances. The state rates range from two
cents in Oklahoma to fifty cents in New York per hundred dollars
of value. The rates in Oklahoma are graduated in conformity with
the length of time of maturity of mortgages. Electrical energy,
taxed by the national government at three per cent, is taxed also
11First National Bank of Boston v. Matne, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932) cited
In Lawrence v. State Tax Commrnsston, 52 Sup. Ct. 556, 557 see Beufler
v. South Carolina, 51 Sup. Ct. 54, Baldwin v. Iissour, 281 U. S. 586; and
Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, also, Harding, A. L., Double Taxation of Property and Income, 1933.
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by the States of Alabama, Idaho, South Carolina, and Vermont at
two-fifths mill per k.w.h. in Alabama and one-half mill in the
other states. Electricity produced by municipal plants is exempted
from excise taxation by South Carolina, Vermont, and the Federal
Government. General turnover taxes, retail sales taxes, and various hybrid forms of sales taxation are found in twenty-six states,
according to the classification of the Tax Research Foundation.
They vary in character from the limited coverage retail sales taxes
of California and of Illinois to the multiple classified gross sales
taxes of West Virginia and of Washington. Fiscal nomenclature
is somewhat lacking for adequate descriptions of certain of these
tax mutations denominated by statutes as gross income, merchants' and manufacturers' license, chain store, retail sales, and
business and occupation taxes. Perhaps, as analogous to the Missouri mule, these fiscal by-products of the current economic depression are, similarly, without pride in ancestry and hope of posterity
Few forms of taxation have accomplished more in the way of producing industrial and commercial friction, unreasonable discrimination, and general dissatisfaction than these devices born of fiscal
need and with a statutory configuration formed of legislative
ignorance, bickerings, dickerings, and compromises.
Enough has been said concerning the existing status of the tax
systems, if they can be called systems, of our federal, state, and
local governments to indicate the seriousness of the fiscal disequilibrium, non-uniformity, inequity, uncertainty, and administrative difficulties which are involved therein. Sooner or later
our essential governmental functions will be seriously affected if
some measure of economy, of balance, and of rationality is not
interjected into our tax systems. Although there has been little
rational planning of the tax systems within the states, even less
attention has been directed to the integration of state systems into
the national pattern. The increasing complexity of state and local
tax systems-a product of the increasing demand for more revenue
and the growing complexity of our economic structure-has caused
wider variations in taxing practices and greater dissimilarity in
the burdens of taxpayers.
The remedial measures which are required to solve the problems
of our uncoordinated tax systems follow the causes. Double taxation, diversity in forms of taxation, administrative difficulties,
uneconomical tax administration, and the like, have their roots in
tax decentralization and non-integration. The broad problem is
one of articulating our fiscal and political systems with the facts
of present-day economic life.
That which is needed is fiscal centralization and standardization
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similar to that which now obtains in the economic field. A like
change is required in our highly decentralized political system.
The incompatibility of localizing wealth, income, and economic
activity for purposes of taxation, when these tax bases are national
and international in scope, should be obvious to all. There is little
doubt that fiscal integration must be accompanied by a re-allocation of governmental functions and a properly synthesized political system.
In considering the rationalization of our fiscal systems there
are certain principles which should not be overlooked. Dual administration of the same form of tax should not be countenanced.
Apparently no good purpose is served by it. A prnm fam~e case
exists against duplicating tax admmtration. From the point of
view of the taxpayer it is illogical and wasteful, involving as it
does unnecessary administrative expense and additional trouble,
uncertainty, and expense to the taxpayer. As we would not think
of having a separate force of tax-gatherers for each jurisdiction
levying a property tax, e.g., school district, city, township, county,
and state, so should we avoid our duplicating sets of tax-collectors
in income, inheritance, and excise tax administration. The administration of the several forms of taxation should be placed in the
hands of those political jurisdictions which can achieve the highest
measure of equality, economy, and general effectiveness. In illustration, the property tax, doubtless, should be administered by the
states rather than the townships or counties, the income tax by the
Federal Government exclusively, rather than state-administered
income taxes, the inheritance tax likewise. In other words, the
taxing authorities must be brought into conformity with, or made
suitable to, the various tax bases.
The problems and tasks of tax administration should be divorced
from the financial requirements of the several political jurisdictions.
The problem of effective tax adminstration is one wheh should
not be beclouded or subverted by the problem of the approprate
divmton and/or provrsion of funds to our distons of government.
To the assumption that each of our units of government should be
permitted independently to levy taxes to meet the costs of that
government, regardless of how unsuited that jurisdiction may have
been, or is, to administer taxes, is traceable much of the tax confusion and maladministration of today If this perspective can be
gained, fiscal integration should not be overly difficult. It is submitted, further, that until taxes are re-allocated or are assigned to
those governments best suited to administer them, and until this
problem is solved on its own merits, the establishment of an orderly
and economical tax systen, in all likelihood, will not be realized.
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Of the many proposals which have been made for coordination
and integration of our fiscal systems only "divswn of the yteld"
and/or the use of "supplements or additwns" appear worthy of
serious consideration. Separation of sources of revenue, meaning
thereby merely separation of forms of taxation, does not imply coordination or integration in any real sense, rather, there is implied,
first, independence in choice of taxes as long as duplication with
other jurisdictions above or below in the political structure is
avoided and the Constitution is not contravened, second, multiplication of forms of taxation as the need for revenue increases,
third, a lack of balance between revenues and needs for some divisions of government, as it is almost inconceivable that each government will secure revenue sources proportionate to its needs, and,
fourth, more or less violation and disregard of efficiency and economy in tax administration. The use of a system of credits, while
it secures, perhaps, coordination of a kind, does not prevent multi,plication of forms of taxation or obtain effectiveness and economy
in tax administration as in the case of separation of sources of
revenue. Further, tax crediting, as practiced by the Federal Government in the estate tax, has led to compulsion and rigidity in
that the states have felt it incumbent upon them to adopt inheritance and/or estate taxes and, in addition, to adjust the rates of
tax to take full advantage of the credit. An extension of the credit
system would cause more, not less, duplication and complexity in
taxation. If the Federal Government provided a credit against
some or all of its internal excises, the states, in all probability,
would quickly adopt similar taxes in amount and number to absorb
the full credit allowance. There would be also the fiscal emasculation of federal revenues, to the extent that credits were allowed,
in proportion to such allowance. The virtues of crediting lie in
the encouragement of a limited amount of standardization of forms
of taxes at the expense of greater duplication and in the reduction
somewhat of tax competition and evasion.
Division of the yield, on the other hand, introduces a unitary
system of administration. Under this proposal, the Federal Government would be assigned those taxes in which substantial administrative advantages are possessed in comparison with the states,
and the states taxes in which like advantages are had in comparison
with the local governments. Provision for the distribution or
division of the yield of taxes among the units of government in
correspondence with the relative scope and cost of functions would
be required. The substance as well as the form of tax integration
would thus be achieved. The thorough-going application of this
plan, doubtless, would mean the withdrawal of the local govern-
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ments from the field of taxation, with the possible exception of
certain local license taxes, the states would administer the property tax and corporation license taxes, while the Federal Government would be charged with the administration of death duties,
and income, excise, and sales taxes. The principal advantages of
the system of division of yield would be the attainment of simplicity of tax structure, efficiency, and economy in tax administration, and the elimination of tax competition, friction, and
evasion by the rationalization of our tax authorities to our tax
bases. There are serious obstacles to the realization of this type of
fiscal relationship. Our state and local governments probably
would not favor what appears to be the financial domination of the
Federal Government, and would hesitate to be placed in a position
of fiscal dependence. Division of yield is defective in that no provision is made for certain necessary elasticity in revenue. This
would be particularly serious for the state governments. It is not
improbable that under this system certain or all of the states may
suffer a deficit in some years while the Federal Government may
be faced with a surplus. The problem of effecting some satisfactory
arrangement as to the division of the yield between the state and
federal governments would be difficult of solution. It is hardly to
be expected that there would be unanimity of opinion as to the
criteria which should serve for division of the revenues. However,
it is not believed that this is an insuperable obstacle to the adoption
of division of yield, as Professor Haig and others are inclined to
think, apparently 11 In fact, progress has been made in this direction by sharing state-adunistered taxes with the local units of
government. In 1931 only the States of Delaware, Rhode Island,
Utah, and West Virginia did not have state-administered locallyshared taxes. 6 The taxes subject to division of yield are principally corporation, income, and motor fuel and notor vehicle
taxes. 6 The yield of these state-administered locally-shared taxes
in 1928 was $261,217,000 of a total state tax revenue of $1,766,950,000, or a ratio of fourteen and seven-tenths per cent.62
Under the pressure of reparation payments in the post-war
period, the fiscal system of Germany was drastically changed in
the direction of a unitary system. Division of yield has been the
method followed to achieve integration. The national government
is now the most important tax levying and collecting authority
There is division of yield to the states with a further sub-divimon
Haig, R. M., op. cit., p. 231.
c New York Commission for ,the Revision of the Tax Laws, Report.
Use of State Revenues for the Support of Local Functions in New York,
Memorandum No. 10, 1932, p. 17.
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to the local governments. In illustration, twenty-five per cent of the
revenue from the personal and corporation income taxes is retained
by the national government, seventy-five per cent is distributed
to the states on the basis of a budget formula, while each state, in
turn, distributes at least fifty per cent of its share to communities in accordance with their relative need, seventy per cent of
the yield of the turnover tax is retained by the national government, thirty per cent distributed to the states on the basis of a
population and payment formula, with the state legislatures able
to make further distribution to the localities if desired, four per
cent of the yield of the automobile tax is held by the national government to cover costs of administration, and ninety-six per cent
is returned to the states on the basis of a population, payment,
and area formula, with the states required to use the funds for
the public ways, all the inheritance tax revenue is retained by the
national government.
France also has achieved substantial tax integration. The national government functions as the principal tax levying and collecting agency, sharing the revenues, in part, with the departments
and communes.
While division of yield is a practicable method of achieving integration of our federal, state, and local tax systems as exemplified
by the German and French fiscal practices, the difficulties confronting its adoption and the disadvantages inherent in the system
make it less worthy of recommendation than the system of supplements or additions.
Under a plan of integration through the use of the method of
supplements or additions, the primary tax administrative authority would be the Federal Government, as in the case of division of yield. The states, however, would be free to increase or
diminish their proportion of the levies of the federally-shared and
federally-collected taxes in correspondence with their needs. The
local governments would be similarly treated in the levies of stateshared taxes. The rates of the various shared taxes would be elastic and would be changed in conformity to changes in the composite demand for revenue. Taxpayers would pay only a single tax
of given form as, e. g., only one income tax, a single excise tax,
and the like. This method of integrating the tax systems of our
governments includes not only all the advantages of division of
yield, which need not be repeated, but, in addition, provides for
elasticity in revenues and meets the objection that division of yield
is impracticable because the federal and state governments can
not agree on the distribution formula. There would be also less in
the way of state compulsion and subjection.
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The system of integration through supplements or additions
is not without weaknesses, however. If the tax rates of the income
tax, for example, were uniform as to progression throughout the
country and based upon the composite demands of the federal and
state governments, objection could be made that some states were
being taxed for the benefit of other states. The states, also, may
attempt to load too heavy an addition upon one or all of the federally-administered and -shared taxes with a view of obtaining
major relief for the property tax through the resharmg of the
revenue with the local units of government. On the other hand, if
the supplement or addition by a state to a federally-administered
tax applied only to the taxpayers of the state in question, there
would be complications in the administration of the tax, interstate frictions occasioned by the apportionment and localization
of interstate income and wealth, little or no equalization of governmental services between and among the states, and little or no improvement in the spreading of the tax burdens among the states in
proportion to relative wealth and income, also, a reasonable balance between direct and indirect taxes, while obtaining in some
states, perhaps, would not obtain in others, and government in the
United States from a tax point of view would be treated as more
or less unrelated parts rather than as a unity Further, criticisms
.may be raised that the tax interests of certain states may not fit
into the federal pattern, also, that a high degree of integration
may preclude desirable state variation and experimentation in tax
provisions and admmimstrative procedures with a common form of
tax. While these and other objections may be made to tax integration through the use of supplements or additions, it should be
realized that no system of integration will be without certain
weaknesses. However, the problems are by no means incapable of
being solved. The objective is to select that procedure, or those
combined procedures, involving the fewest theoretical and practical disadvantages, taken as a whole, capable of producing a properly integrated, unitary tax system.
Of the several proposals as to specific procedures to accomplish
integration the system of supplements or additions appears most
suitable if subject to adequate controls to prevent abuses. It is
hardly to be expected, however, that the coordination and unification of the federal, state, and local tax systems will be brought
about by the adoption of any single integrating procedure to the
exclusion of all others, rather, it appears probable that various
procedures may be combined to effectuate this result. The partial
integration of certain state and local tax systems has been accomplished by the use of diverse methods. Professor Haig states that
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integration in New York, to the extent achieved, has been through
the withdrawal of the state general property tax levy, through
grants-rn-aid, and through sharing state-administered taxes with
the local governments.6 In addition, the state attempts to regulate effectively locally-administered taxes. With the experiences
and procedures of New York and other states in state and local
governmental coordination of revenues to serve as guides to tax
integration by the federal and state governments, a combination of
grants-in-aid, division of yield, and, perhaps, supplements or additions may be used as the principal procedures to bring about the
desired result.
It seems inevitable that thorough-going tax integration must
soon replace the fiscal confusion, conflicts, and administrative
wastes which characterize our present system as the pressure of
economic and social forces operating to this end become greater.
The severe fiscal pains and, on occasion, fiscal paralysis, evoked
by the continuation of an antiquated fiscal system unsuited to the
needs of the complex present-day economic and social order, should
assist the public to obtain a better perspective by overcoming the
existing political astigmatism. The improvement in the tax spread,
the better balance between direct and indirect taxes, the provision
of a measure of property tax relief, the reduction of tax administrative costs, the elimination of interstate tax conflicts and frictions, the higher minimum performance of governmental functions
between and among states, the more effective state control of local
taxation and expenditures, and the inducement of a greater measure of public respect for tax laws as end-products of proper tax
integration are so important and necessary to the public welfare
as not to be long in realization.
An argument advanced against tax integration is that it would
prevent tax experimentation on the part of states. Conversely, it
is said that the existing situation of non-uniformity and administrative duplication, while admittedly wasteful and a source of tax
conflicts, is responsible for a substantial gain in the ascertainment,
through experimentation by trial and error, of improved techniques in tax administration, of improved tax character as found in
statutory provisions and features, and of greater knowledge of the
incidence and economic effects of variations in the same general
form of tax. It will be readily granted that our decentralized, haphazard, and illogical tax systems have not been wholly deficient,
0 New York Commission for the Revision of the Tax Laws, op. cit.,
p. 73.
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and that some, Although perhaps slight, benefits have been forthconmg in the way of certain desirable experimental results. It seems,
however, that the net result has been "what not to do" rather than
"what to do" in taxation. It has been negative rather than positive,
restrictive rather than constructive. Error is present -m the argument of the opponents of integration in the tacit assumption that a
highly integrated tax system would preclude intelligent, farsighted,
and constructive experimentation. In that the Federal Government
is less susceptible to the exigencies of expediency, opportunism,
and competitive tax considerations than the states, tax experimentation of the Federal Government should pronse much more in
the way of constructive results than equal experimentation by the
states, also, experimentation relating to the property tax, for example, by the states should produce constructive benefits far more
significant than proportionate experimentation by counties and
townships with the same tax.
It seems questionable whether the tax practices of state and local
governments should be dignified by the use of the term experimentation. If the term experimentation connotes reasonable foresight, intelligence, and a planned approach as applied to the tax
problem, it appears to be a misnomer. State and local tax practices, n the main, have been the resultants of local neo-mercantilistic policies, competition, opportunism, short-sighted pressure
polities, and expediency In fruition these forces have produced
legal, extra-legal, and illegal tax exemptions, subsidies and classifications, tax colonies, as in Florida, with the constitution prohibition
against income and inheritance taxes, badly disequilibrated tax
structures, excessive annoyance and expense to taxpayers, particularly interstate corporations, discrininatory taxation of a vicious
character as exemplified by chain store sales and occupation taxes,
and the like. In view of past and present experience with state and
local so-called tax experimentation, the opponents of integration
will do well not to press this argument. It should be taken cur
grano salis.
There are various major difficulties confronting the establishment of an integrated tax system. It is not to be expected that there
will be a clear, unobstructed path out of the present tax morass..
The existence of dual sovereignties m government isa substantial
obstacle to integration as the state governments, doubtless, will
feel it incumbent upon themselves to preserve their quasi-independence, particularly in taxation, even though it is done at the
expense and sacrifice of the welfare of their citizens. Considerable
state opposition may be anticipated on the ground that integration
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involves state subjection, relegation to a position of secondary importance, coercion and loss of function, patronage and "face."
Public officials and others who are beneficiaries of the present system will allege a fundamental violation of "states' rights" even
though such insistence means the violation of the rights of citizens
to an orderly, balanced, and economical tax system. Efforts will
be made to preserve formal rights at the sacrfice of basic economic
and soctal consideratons. State and local governmental political
patronage found in tax administration is no mean consideration to
those who will endeavor to preserve the statis quo. These voices
are so numerous that the very volume of noise will pass for profundity and will have effect in obstructing the path to integration.
Public inertia is a passive force against which the proponents of
reform, even intelligent reform, must contend. Fortunately, economic and social pressures are moving so strongly in the direction
of integration that public inertia and lethargy are being shaken.
There is no longer public apathy to the existing situation. It is
likely to be contended that integration involves the taxation of one
state or one region for the benefit of other states and regions. The
correctness of the allegation will depend, of course, upon the character of tax integration and the distribution of the revenues. However, to those who believe in equalization of education and other
social services performed by government, to those who favor spreading the tax burdens of the country in proportion to relative wealth
and income it is not an objection, but, instead, a strong argument for
integration. The principle of equalization of opportunity, particularly educational opportunity, has been accepted generally by
states, and has been made effective by increasing the proportion
of the individual state's contribution to common school support
with distribution on some basis of relative need. There is fuller
realization and appreciation of the fact that the economic and social welfare of those in one community, state, or region is closely
interrelated with the welfare of those in other communities, states,
and regions. In consequence, taxation for other states and regions
does not constitute the bogey of the past. If we recall that distance
is a function of time and that the friction of space has been nullified to the extent that we are economically and socially neighbors
with one another, regardless of physical location, a proper perspective will be had. In commenting on this situation Professor
Haig suggests that "cost, in time and labor, of overcoming the
friction of space is, after all, the most important factor govermng
the economical size of the administrative unit. Today in these terms
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the United States of America is much smaller than was the state
of New York alone when the Constitution of the United. States was
adopted
one hundred and forty-five years ago."64
There are, of course, beneficiaries of the present inequitable
system who would oppose change. The legal complexity, conflicts,
and constitutional and statutory violations developing out of our
existing tax systems have fostered a host of "professional tax experts," "tax-fixers," and "tax attorneys" who have prospered and
multiplied as the proverbial green bay tree. State and local officials, whose connection with the public payroll is through tax administration, would hardly wax enthusiastic over integration. Individuals and corporations whose taxable wealth and income are
large and who are benefiting substantially through situs in tax
colonies, through legal, extra-legal, or illegal discrimnnations, and
the like, may approve integration in the abstract but not in the
concrete. In illustration, on occasions, in dealing with the problem
of inequitable property assessments in conferences and committees, we find the representatives of certain large corporations
strongly endorsing improvement in assessment procedure. When,
however, a concrete proposal, such as the centralization of all property assessments in the state tax commission is made, these representatives first qualify and hedge their endorsement, and then, if
pressed, repudiate their prior assent. They agree that assessments,
doubtless, would be more equitable under a centralized as compared with a decentralized system. On occasion, they state frankly
that they are favored by the existing discrimination, that their
"tax-fixers" have made satisfactory arrangements with the local
assessors, and that under a more equitable assessment system their
tax contributions, in all likelihood, would be larger.
There is a growing public conviction that the time has passed
when the federal, state, and local goverhnments may safely go their
separate competitive ways in dealing with the tax problem. 5 State
and local tax officials confess their inability to deal with problems of tax administration hedged as they are by state and local
boundaries. They complain of their futile efforts to establish
" "The Coordination of the Federal and State Tax Systems," op. cit.,
p. 232.
"The New York Commission for the Revision of the Tax Laws unanimously recommended "that the legislature address a petition to the congress of the United States urging that a commission be established to
consider the present relations between the revenue system of the federal
government and those of the various state governments and to suggest such
modifications in the existing arrangements as may seem desirable" In
the "belief that the problem of the relations of the federal and state revenue
systems is already serious and is likely to grow more serious with the
passage of time." Report, 1932, Part 1, pp. 22-23.
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equitable assessments for complex inter-county and interstate properties, to localize income for taxation, to prevent tax evasion, and
to administer taxes in accordance with statutory intent. There is
an appreciation of the fact that Gresham's law applies to competing tax systems as it does to currencies. The public advantage
requires that government be visualized as a unit, that there be
conscious coordination and integration in the largest and most
important business of all, the business of government.

